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Abstract: While policy information utilization in the Public Service has been the subject of 
investigation, little is known in Canada about how legislators seek out knowledge or respond to 
information provided by external actors. Often described as lacking influence within the policy 
process, the average Canadian MP is assumed to engage little in policy-making. Based on a 
survey conducted amongst Members of the Canadian Parliament in April 2013, this paper 
investigates how MPs engage with both internal and external sources of information and what 
are some of the potential factors that explain MPs’ utilization of policy knowledge. Findings 
indicate that internal sources of information are the most regularly consulted, yet that amongst 
external providers, academic research is valued most highly. In line with recent literature on 
policy networks, results suggest that personal contact between policy actors is one of the most 
important mechanisms to ensure a positive reception of information. The overall conclusion is 
that MPs continue to have a strong interest in policy and respond positively to lobbying, whether 
these are the efforts of industry associations or academics disseminating their research. 
Keywords:  knowledge utilization; Canadian MPs; policy networks; Federal policy-making 
Résumé : Bien que l’utilisation du savoir au sein de la fonction publique ait fait l’objet de 
nombreuses études, peu d’auteurs se sont intéressés à la manière dont les députés recherchent des 
informations et réagissent aux données qui leur sont présentées par les acteurs externes à 
l’institution parlementaire. Les députés fédéraux sont souvent décrits comme ayant peu 
d’influence au sein du processus politique et participant peu à l’élaboration de politiques. À 
partir d’un sondage réalisé en avril 2013 auprès de députés fédéraux, cet article explore comment 
ces derniers utilisent les sources d’information internes et externes et quels facteurs expliquent 
leur utilisation du savoir. Les résultats indiquent que les sources d’information internes sont les 
plus souvent consultées, mais que parmi les producteurs de connaissance externes à l’institution 
parlementaire, la recherche universitaire est la plus prisée. De plus, à l’instar des découvertes 
récentes dans le domaine des « réseaux de politiques », une analyse statistique semble indiquer 
que le contact personnel entre les députés et les acteurs externes est l’un des mécanismes les plus 
importants pour assurer la diffusion et une réception positive de l’information. En conclusion, les 
députés continuent de s’intéresser à l’élaboration de politiques et semblent réagir de façon 
positive au lobbying, que ces efforts soient faits par des associations d’industries ou des 
chercheurs disséminant leur recherche. 
Mots-clé : utilisation du savoir; Députés Canadiens; réseaux de politiques; élaboration de 
politiques 
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Introduction 
In their role as representatives, party members, and legislators, Canadian Members of 
Parliament (MPs) are little different from elected representatives operating in other jurisdictions. 
The Canadian backbencher
1
, however, is often described as subject to stronger party discipline 
than his or her counterpart in Congress or even Westminster (Thomas, 1985, quoted in Docherty, 
1997: 21; Flavelle and Kaye, 1986; Malloy, 2003), and as having only limited opportunities to 
take part in policy and law-making (Blidook, 2012). Moreover, Cabinet Members and the Civil 
servants who conduct the bulk of policy work in Canada are generally considered to have 
virtually no incentive to share information and involve MPs when developing legislation or 
programs (Savoie, 2003: 179-182).  
Yet there is evidence that at least some actors take MPs seriously: a look at the 
Commissioner of Lobbying’s website2, for example, indicates that even individuals who are not 
Cabinet Members receive regular visits from a variety of lobbyists representing both business 
interests and non-profit organizations. A random sample of 20 MPs reveals that the average 
number of registered communications with lobbyists between March 2014 and March 2015 was 
29. This is lower than the number of contacts between the Finance Minister (71) and registered 
lobbyists, but somewhat similar to what the Health Minister (37) faced over the same period. 
When lobbyists seek MPs’ attention, or when the latter are required to engage in some form of 
policy work, a process of information exchange and acquisition must necessarily take place. 
Little is known about how Members respond to the policy suggestions of lobbyists or sift 
                                                          
1“A member of the UK parliament who does not have any official position in the government or in one of the 
opposing parties” (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2015). For the purposes of this paper, “backbencher” refers to 
MPs who are not Party leaders, Members of Cabinet, Parliamentary Secretaries, Speakers and deputy speakers, or a 
party’s House Leader.  
2 Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada (2015). Retrieved March 20, 2015, from  
https://ocl-cal.gc.ca/app/secure/orl/lrrs/do/clntSmmrySrch?lang=eng  
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through the masses of information available to them. With the expansion of universities, think 
tanks, public policy schools, and the multiplication of private sector research through banks or 
consulting firms, there is an abundance of information available to lawmakers. The latter must 
now navigate an increasingly complex web of knowledge and policy proposals emanating from a 
variety of sources in order to make decisions, advocate for policies, or solve problems in their 
constituencies (Rich, 1975; Webber, 1991). This article seeks to answer two interrelated 
questions. What sources of knowledge do Members of Parliament consult in their policy work 
and what are some of the potential factors that explain MPs’ utilization of information sources? 
Before proceeding to describe the methodology and report the results of a survey conducted in 
April 2013 amongst backbenchers of the Canadian Parliament, the literature on the interrelated 
issue of policy networks and knowledge diffusion will be discussed.  
 
A. Literature Review: Policy Information Utilization Factors 
Recognizing that policy information is not the only type of data available to 
policymakers, authors frequently distinguish between policy/technical and political information 
(Sabatier and Whiteman, 1985: 397; Bradley, 1980). This paper will focus solely on the former. 
Information of this type is defined by Webber (1987b) as “scientific and technical information 
about the ways a policy actually works, or would work if it were to be adopted” (1987b: 666). 
Webber warns of placing too many constraints on the definition of policy-relevant information – 
a view adopted herein – as it necessarily extends beyond “professional social enquiry” (1991: 8) 
and includes such things as journalistic accounts and letters from constituents. 
A number of factors influence the likelihood that policy information will be consulted 
and integrated by legislators in their work. If the tenets of evidence-based policy-making are to 
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be believed, improving the quality of information and the effectiveness of its diffusion to key 
decision-makers will result in better public policy (see for instance Howlett, 2009; Demaj and 
Summermatter, 2012). Yet given that legislators must navigate a variety of issues and priorities, 
the use of information is not solely predicated on its objectivity and quality. A good starting 
point, on which this paper will rely, is Lester and Wild’s (1990) proposal to divide the various 
factors influencing information utilization in three groups: individual interest and preference 
factors, “contextual” or “institutional” factors and “technical” factors. However, Lester and 
Wild’s conceptualization is perhaps unduly focused on processes internal to the decision maker’s 
organization, and given the potentially growing importance of external policy actors such as 
lobbyists and think tanks in the Canadian political context (Savoie, 2003, Abelson, 2000, p.232), 
a fourth mechanism – the role of policy networks – must also be addressed. A brief consideration 
of the four factors will be useful to frame the present study. 
 
Individual interests and preferences 
 A first key element in the process by which information is integrated in legislation and 
policy concerns MPs’ interests and motivations. These span from the more self-interested goals 
of re-election (Pappi and Henning, 1998) and career advancement within the legislature 
(Docherty, 1997) to ideological orientations (Webber, 1986) and the public interest. In seeking 
information, decision-makers attempt to fill a knowledge “gap” with the purpose of reducing 
uncertainty
3
 or to meet a real or perceived need (Oh and Rich, 1996: 11). Moreover, legislators 
may draw upon their prior education and experience to guide both the knowledge search and the 
formulation of policy (Webber, 1991: 13). For instance, individuals are likely to seek 
                                                          
3
 Demaj and Summermatter (2012, p.95) apply Brenda Dervin’s (1983) “Sense-Making-Approach” as a model of 
information-seeking behaviour. 
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information that corresponds to their own ideology (Rose, 1991: 17; Kingdon, 1981, quoted in 
Bimber, 1991: 592; Calvert, 1985). In addition, political values may even affect beliefs about the 
usefulness of public policy knowledge more generally.
4
 Once this knowledge search is initiated 
or policy information is received through intermediaries such as lobbyists, “policymakers’  
reactions to and  preconceptions  of  the  different  sources  or  couriers  of  policy knowledge” 
(Webber, 1991: 29-30) are also thought to intervene before knowledge is accepted as valid or 
implemented. 
David Webber’s study of social science policy information utilization in the Indiana State 
Legislature uncovered that different legislator ‘orientations’ were associated with more 
knowledge use: the ‘policy conveyor role’ – “activities directed at informing constituents about 
legislative activities” (1987: 668) – open-mindedness, and political ambition, emerged as the 
strongest predictors. In the Canadian context, Docherty observed that ambitious politicians were 
more likely to place greater emphasis on policy-making activities as this was a perceived 
criterion for promotion to Cabinet (1997: 115). Finally, positive and negative attitudes towards 
social science and other types of research have also been identified as an important variable for 
explaining knowledge search and utilization practices (Webber, 1987b; Oh and Rich, 1996). 
 
Contextual / Institutional factors 
“Contextual” or institutional factors are frequently invoked in the literature as vital 
elements in the chain between information diffusion and policy-making efforts (Webber, 1986; 
James and Jorgensen, 2009; Weible et al., 2012). For Bimber, “institutional arrangements shape 
the relevance of expertise to political outcomes” (1991: 587). The work of a federal MP is 
                                                          
4
 According to Webber: “Legislators who advocate a limited role for government on ideological grounds need not be 
concerned with informing themselves about how a policy actually works and, therefore, will not rely on policy 
information” (1986: 268). 
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described as including budgetary, legislative, and representative functions as well as keeping the 
government accountable (Montigny & Pelletier, 2005). Activities are often demarcated between 
constituency and parliamentary work. David Docherty’s (1997) study of Canadian 
parliamentarians illustrates that after having been elected, most MPs find themselves frustrated 
by the monopoly held by party leaders and the Cabinet over policy-making. Backbenchers may 
arrive in Ottawa with policy goals in mind, yet discovering that public policy decisions are made 
in the offices of the Prime minister or party leaders (Ibid: 118) often discourages further policy 
work and pushes MPs towards dedicating the bulk of their work to constituency service (see also 
Price and Mancuso, 1991). The centralization of power around the Prime Minister and senior 
public servants is a common theme in Canadian political science (see for instance Savoie, 2008) 
and is exacerbated by a relatively weak parliamentary committee system (Thomas, 1978, Malloy, 
2004) – one of the few forums where Members, especially those from the Opposition, can 
participate in policy discussions. Opportunities such as committee work, Private Members 
Business, as well as unofficial influence through the party caucus (see Samara Canada, 2011; 
Soroka, et al., 2009) do exist however, and are available to MPs as possible avenues for 
influencing policy. Ultimately, the most important variable is likely to be the MP’s membership 
in the governing party’s caucus, a position which provides privileges such as early knowledge of 
legislative agendas and a forum to directly challenge the Prime Minister (Savoie, 2003: 179).  
 
Technical factors: The nature of the information 
The type and format in which policy information is packaged is another important 
variable that may predict positive reception and knowledge utilization amongst decision-makers. 
The ‘two-communities’ metaphor (Caplan, 1979, Dunn, 1980) is the classic interpretation of the 
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gulf lying between scientific or academic research and decision-makers’ needs. It posits that the 
likelihood of information being used depends on the degree to which it is adapted to the needs of 
policymakers (Webber, 1991; Oh, 1997: 5; Landry et al., 2001: 335). This theory has 
implications for academic research in particular since it is not usually produced with a policy-
making audience in mind (MacRae, 1991: 31). Indeed, university and research organizations 
were rated as one of the least useful information providers by Indiana state legislators in the 
1980s (Webber, 1987a). Only 5% of respondents considered this type of research useful, a 
number that can be compared to figures of 40% and 29% for constituents and interest groups 
(Ibid: 622). While interviewing congressional staff, Weiss observed that interest group 
information was preferred to objective academic research as advisors “can gauge what kind of 
‘correction factor’ they have to apply” (1989: 421). Bradley (1980: 400) also found that valued 
attributes of information sources for Nevada Legislators in 1978 were convenience, accessibility, 
and understandability. While no research has specifically studied information utilization in 
Canadian legislatures, Landry et al. (2003) found that while information type was a statistically 
significant variable, it was not a very important factor for explaining the degree of knowledge 
utilization amongst policy advisors within the Public Service. 
Be that as it may, it should not be inferred that the objectivity of information is of no 
importance to policymakers. Feller et al. found through a survey of legislators from eight 
different U.S. states that there was “a clear preference for objective or unbiased sources of 
information” (1979: 425). Perhaps even more interesting is Sabatier and Whiteman’s observation 
that among staff in the California Legislature, University faculty were rated highly on 
“substantive competence” and fairly highly on “objectivity”, yet low ratings were provided for 
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“accessibility and timeliness and on the ability to provide concise, relevant information” (1985: 
411).  
 
Policy network factors 
Focusing solely on the institution of Parliament in order to understand the policy process 
would be misleading in the contemporary Canadian context. Pappi and Henning argue for 
example that modern policy-making has been characterized by “the enlargement of the set of 
consequential actors” (1998: 553). In Breaking the Bargain, Savoie suggests that the rise of 
lobbyists, think tanks, consultants and the 24h news cycle contributed to enhancing the power of 
politicians within the policy process and especially that of the Prime minister (2003). Such a 
power shift occurred at the expense of civil servants’ traditional influence over policy in Canada.  
The best framework for understanding this recent tendency is perhaps the idea of a policy 
‘network’ or ‘community’. A policy community is defined by Coleman and Skogstad as “all 
actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share a 
common ‘policy focus,’ and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over 
the long run” (1990: 25). Given that the members of policy networks are defined as actors who 
“maintain relations like information or resource exchange, influence attribution or common 
group membership” (Leifeld and Schneider, 2012: 731), policy networks can be described as the 
active relationships that are maintained around a particular policy issue (see also Coleman and 
Skogstad, 1990: 26). Börzel further proposes that these relationships or networks, “do not 
directly serve for decision-making but for the information, communication and exercise of 
influence in the preparation of decisions” (1998: 263). Variables such as trust (Bimber, 1980: 
601; Weible et al., 2012), shared goals, ideology (Henry, Lubell and McCoy, 2011) as well as 
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interpersonal contacts and interactions (Oh and Rich, 1996; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998: 128; 
Landry et al., 2003) have all been identified as favouring the transfer and use of information 
within a policy network. For example, personal interactions with officials through lobbying were 
judged to be much more effective by advocacy groups in the Canadian context than House of 
Commons committee appearances, financial contributions to political parties, or letters to 
political representatives (Canada’s Public Policy Forum, 2001: 18).  
 
B. Data and Methodology  
My participation in the Canadian Political Science Association’s Parliamentary 
Internship Program provided an opportunity to distribute a survey through the House of 
Commons internal mail service. The questionnaire was prepared in both French and English and 
sent to MPs’ Parliamentary offices in the first week of April 2013. The research instrument 
aimed for hypothesis generation and description of backbenchers’ information-collecting 
practices rather than testing a particular explanatory model. The survey method was selected in 
order to reach as many MPs as possible in a short amount of time. Surveys were distributed to 
239 offices, a list which excluded the Cabinet, Parliamentary secretaries, Party Leaders
5
, Whips, 
House Leaders, and the Speaker. The decision to exclude Cabinet members, Leaders, and House 
of Commons officials was made on the basis that, in comparison to the average MP, these 
individuals’ roles either greatly enhance (for the former) or completely eliminate (for the latter) 
participation in policy-making. Sixty-three questionnaires were returned, one of which had to be 
eliminated due to an exceedingly high number of missing answers. This yielded a total of 62 
completed surveys and a response rate of 25.9%. In total, 29 members of the New Democratic 
                                                          
5
 The Leader of the Green Party was at the time of the survey the only elected Member of this party and was 
therefore included in the sampling frame. 
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Party (NDP), 18 Conservatives, 13 Liberals, and three “others” returned the questionnaire. Given 
that survey responses were not representative of party distributions in the House of Commons, 
weights were calculated and applied to the analysis when data is analysed in aggregate. For data 
protection reasons, results for the “other party” category are not identified nor analysed. 
 
C. Description of MPs’ Knowledge Consultation Practices 
 Two main pathways are followed in the transfer of information between knowledge 
producers and Members of Parliament. Either the actor holding policy information actively 
attempts to transmit his or her knowledge, or the office holder seeks out information as part of 
policy-making endeavours. The distinction roughly corresponds to the ‘science-push’ and the 
‘demand-pull’ models of information diffusion (Landry, et al., 2001). Before proceeding to 
explore some of the reasons why Canadian MPs consider some knowledge sources to be more or 
less useful for their policy work, it is first important to describe what kinds of information MPs 
seek and/or are frequently presented with.  
 
Active consultation of information 
 A questionnaire item was developed on the basis of observations made over the course of 
my work in the offices of two MPs and by consulting a number of secondary sources (Bradley, 
1980; Abelson, 2000; Young and Everitt, 2010; Cohn, 2006). The providers of policy 
information included in the questionnaire are not necessarily the original knowledge producers, 
but instead represent organizations or individuals who provide secondary or primary information 
to MPs, either through face to face contact or via the publication and dissemination of 
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Sources of knowledge % Likely to consult
Library of Parliament 93.4
Academic and scientific publications 80.7
Constituents 78
Party and Leadership Research 69.9
Not for profit 63.2
Think tanks / policy institutes 57.4
Industry associations 52.7
Government publications 49.7
Private sector research 47.7
Labour unions 28.3
information.  Respondents were asked “What knowledge sources are you or your staff likely to 
consult in your policy-making efforts?”  Results are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Likelihood of policy information consultation amongst MPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Three knowledge providers were reported to be almost universally consulted by 
Parliamentarians and/or their staff: the Library of Parliament, constituents, as well as academic 
and scientific publications. The existing literature can explain quite well the popularity of the 
first; information purveyors internal to an organization are often more likely to be consulted due 
to their favourable institutional position (see for instance, Mooney, 1991: 447; Head et al., 2014). 
The Library’s role in creating knowledge free of charge, on-demand, and specifically geared to 
Member’s needs undoubtedly reduces transaction costs and makes this parliamentary institution 
especially appealing as a source of policy information. Interestingly, another internal source – 
Party and Leadership research – was also considered an important policy information purveyor 
by a high percentage of Canadian federal legislators (69.9%). This finding may reflect the 
strength of party discipline in Canada and the tendency for backbenchers to follow the advice of 
their leaders when conducting policy work. Abelson (2000) points to the Prime minister’s office 
for instance as being a de facto policy shop.  
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 On the other hand, the high percentage of MPs who claimed that they were likely to 
consider academic research is slightly surprising if the ‘two-communities’ metaphor is accepted. 
The observation that constituents were also a likely source of policy knowledge by a large 
majority of MPs may be somewhat antithetical to expert-driven “evidence-based” policy-
making, yet coherent in a context where, as Docherty’s (1997) argues, focus on constituency 
work is essentially imposed by the Parliament’s institutional rules. On the other hand, the 
popularity of information emanating from the Member’s constituency was not universal across 
political parties as only 41.7% of sampled Liberal MPs reported regularly using this information 
source in comparison to 83.3% of Conservatives and 84.6% of New Democrats (Cramer’s φc = 
0.368, p < 0.05).  
 The only other two statistically significant differences between political parties concerned 
the consultation of private sector research (Cramer’s φc = 0.334, p < 0.05) and labour unions 
(Cramer’s φc = 0.493, p < 0.01). Party ideology appears prima facie to account for differences in 
the consultation pattern of the latter two sources of information: the Conservatives’ pro-business 
stance may explain their greater tendency to use private sector research, while the number of 
labour unions officially and ideologically affiliated with the NDP could explain why unions are 
an attractive information source. The Liberals’ lesser interest in constituency consultation is 
more difficult to interpret. A possible explanation relates to the high educational levels of party 
members who responded to the survey, which could result in MPs having a greater belief in their 
own expertise. Alternatively, sampled Liberal respondents were also more experienced and may 
thus perceive their legislative role as that of a ‘trustee’ rather than a ‘delegate’ (see Gross, 1978: 
361). 
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Contacts with external policy actors 
 MPs and their staff who actively seek policy data represent only one side of the wider 
exchange of information taking place around Parliament Hill – the other being the action of 
various policy knowledge producers or brokers who attempt to influence the policy process. The 
survey explored some elements of this relationship. In this part of the analysis, the focus is 
placed on four important external policy actors who are either active in lobbying and/or actively 
disseminate their research: academics, industry associations and businesses, non-profit 
organizations, and think tanks/policy institutes. This categorization of policy knowledge 
suppliers may not correspond to legal definitions (ie. industry associations are technically non-
profits), but it reflects a classification based on Max Weber’s conceptualization of social action, 
especially with regards to the distinction between means-end and value-rationality (Kalberg, 
1980). Industry associations, for example, represent business interests, and by proxy, operate 
according to “material” as opposed to “ideational motivations” (see Jacobs, 2015). Such a 
distinction is intuitive and represents more accurately the nature of interventions in the policy 
process than abstract legal categories.  
 Analysis of survey results suggests that non-profit organizations and industry associations 
were more often in touch with MPs than either academics or representatives from think tanks. 
The rate of MPs’ contact with the four knowledge providers varied on the basis of membership 
in the three main political parties, yet the only statistically significant difference observed was 
for academics (χ² = 16.777, p < 0.01). Indeed, 40% of NDP MPs claimed to be in touch with 
academics at least once per week, in comparison to 20% of Liberals who reported a similar level 
of contact and 13.6% of Conservatives. A similar pattern emerged for non-profits as 64% of 
NDP MPs reported being in contact with their representatives at least once per week, with 
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figures of 44.4% for Liberals and 31.8% for Conservatives. In contrast, 43.5% of Conservative 
MPs answered that they were in touch at least every week with industry associations or private 
companies while 33.3% of Liberals and 24.4% of New Democrats made the same claim. One 
could suggest that Conservative Members’ frequent contacts with the business community 
follows the logic of policy networks – especially on ideological grounds – yet the possibility that 
Conservative MPs simply received more requests because they were the governing party cannot 
be excluded either. Nonetheless, similarity of worldview appeared to account at least to some 
extent for the pattern of meetings between policy actors and legislators at the time of the survey, 
especially if one locates the Liberal party between the New Democrats and the Conservatives on 
the ideological spectrum. Finally, regarding think tanks, very few MPs claimed to be in touch 
once a week or more, although 38.5% of New Democrats reported to be in contact with this type 
of organization “once or twice per month” in comparison to figures of 13% for Conservatives 
and 33.3% for Liberals.  
 
D. Testing a Model of Knowledge Utilization 
As pointed out by Knott and Wildavsky (1980: 543), the reception of information does 
not necessarily imply that it will be “used” or implemented by the decision maker in his or her 
work. Rather, the authors propose seven steps to describe the application of knowledge in policy-
making, from simple acknowledgement to full implementation. Yet, self-reports about the degree 
of knowledge utilization are likely to be affected by high levels of recall bias; especially since 
the implementation of knowledge generally takes place in subtle ways, in what Carol Weiss 
describes as “knowledge creep” or “enlightenment” (1980; 1989) – a process which the MP may 
not be fully aware of. In addition, given that backbenchers’ influence may be more indirect 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9 No. 3 2015-2016: 99-130. 
113 
 
because of the dearth of formal channels through which to engage in the policy process, they 
may find it difficult to link policy knowledge use with a specific outcome. For these reasons, the 
following section explores MPs’ evaluation of the usefulness of academic research, as well as 
policy knowledge shared by think tanks, non-profit organizations, and industry associations and 
businesses.  Support for this line of reasoning is found in the data: the usefulness of each 
knowledge source is highly correlated with Members’ reports that they are likely to consult this 
provider of knowledge in their policy-making efforts. 
 
The outcome variable 
 In the survey, participating MPs were asked to rate the usefulness of information 
provided by the four policy actors discussed in the previous section. This was measured on a 1-
10 Likert scale, with ten being “extremely useful” and one “completely useless”. The hope is that 
by comparing MPs’ evaluations of these four purveyors of policy information, one of the key 
determinants of knowledge diffusion in policy-making will be taken into account: the 
characteristics of the information provided. While there is undoubtedly much variation in the 
knowledge produced within each category of actors, enough commonality exists in the aims and 
nature of the information provided by academics, think tanks, non-profits, and the private sector 
to constitute an interesting basis for comparison.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, it is fairly clear that knowledge produced or disseminated by 
academics was considered on average to be most useful for policy-making work amongst this 
cohort of Canadian backbenchers – quite a contrast with Webber’s (1987a) findings for Indiana 
state legislators in the 1980s, where academic research was perceived to be one of the least 
useful sources of policy information. Non-profit organizations are rated marginally higher than 
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think tanks, followed by industry associations and private companies. While the remainder of the 
analysis herein explores why MPs consider each source of knowledge more or less useful, a 
question remains: why is academic research valued so highly by all MPs? This cannot be fully 
answered in the context of the present study, yet one of the survey items provides some hints for 
a possible explanation. Respondents were asked to report why they trusted certain knowledge 
sources over others. Two of these were selected by a vast majority of MPs: “the organization is 
non-partisan and neutral” (75.8%) and “the research is scientific and verifiable” (85.5%), 
answers which can be contrasted with “I share the organization’s / the person’s views” (36.1%) 
and “I trust the individual researcher” (38.7%).6 These findings suggest that, in large part, 
academic research is valued more than the other three sources of information due to its strength 
in providing objective and verifiable data. 
Figure 1: Judgements of policy information sources’ usefulness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 It is of course possible that MPs are attempting to present themselves in a positive light rather than expressing their 
true preferences. 
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Moral/religious 
beliefs Ideology Constituency Party's agenda
Science and 
evidence
Requests from 
industry
Requests from 
nonprofits
Mean 4.25 3.97 2.08 3.05 3.05 5.84 4.67
Median 4 4 2 3 3 6 5
Std. 
Deviation
2.084 2.255 1.068 1.647 1.562 1.288 1.544
Rank 5 4 1 3 2 7 6
Further statistical analysis was conducted in order to better understand why MPs value 
each knowledge source to a greater or lesser degree. The three factors influencing the likelihood 
of knowledge diffusion – individual preferences and interests, institutional factors and network 
dynamics – are treated as exogenous variables predicting the likelihood that policy information 
will be well received by MPs. An explanatory framework is developed and tested in the next 
sections. 
 
Individual preferences and interests 
Individual preferences and interests may affect knowledge utilization and positive 
evaluations of information sources in two ways. First, the more closely an MP is aligned 
ideologically with a knowledge provider, the greater the likelihood this source will be considered 
useful; and second, the greater an MP’s perception that policy information of a certain type 
assists in reaching his or her goals, the likelier this source will be evaluated positively. Party 
membership represents a good proxy for ideology and was integrated in the analysis with dummy 
coding; membership in the Conservative party serves as the reference category. Information on 
the MP’s reasons for engaging in policy work is provided by a survey question which asked 
respondents to rank seven policy motivations in order of importance for their own policy-making 
efforts (see Table 3).  
Table 2: Ranking of policy motivations by MPs 
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Finally, having a strong orientation to policy was also included as a possible predictor of 
how positively MPs receive different sources of information. This is captured by a variable 
assessing whether the respondent wants to implement a particular policy idea not found in their 
party’s platform (0 = no objective, 1 = currently has policy objective, 2 = has had policy 
objective since election). 
 
Contextual/Institutional factors 
 As backbenchers cannot be clearly differentiated on the basis of their access to power 
beyond being a member of either government or opposition parties, there is no obvious way to 
identify their institutional position. A dummy variable representing membership in the 
opposition parties was thus included in the analysis. While having a position within the shadow 
cabinet may also provide opposition MPs with greater opportunities to develop policy, this 
question was not included in the survey. The questionnaire did contain three subjective 
indicators. MPs were asked to comment on: ‘My staff and I have enough time and resources to 
adequately study my area of policy focus’, 1-5 Likert scale, 5 indicating complete agreement). In 
addition, there were two yes/no questions as to whether or not, Parliament, on the one hand, and 
the respondent’s political party, on the other, ‘provide enough opportunities to participate in the 
policy process’ (‘yes’ = 1).  
 
Policy network factors 
 Finally, the hypothesis that policy networks play a role in knowledge diffusion suggests 
that the more MPs are in personal contact with various policy actors, the more likely they are to 
receive positively the knowledge provided by the same actors. Alternatively, MPs may be 
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overwhelmed by frequent meetings and may tend to view negatively the information conveyed 
by organizations and individuals who lobby excessively. The variable capturing this is dummy-
coded for the analysis, with ‘1’ representing Members who claim to meet at least once per month 
with the relevant policy actor. 
 
Control variables 
 Four control variables were also included. These are the MP’s gender, age, length of 
tenure in the House of Commons and level of education. While previous research has not paid 
much attention to such “demographic” characteristics, one study (Askim, 2009) found the 
experience of policymakers at the municipal level in Norway to be a factor associated with a 
greater consultation of performance information. Moreover, gender, age, and the level of 
education are all factors with the potential to influence an individual’s worldview. 
 
E. Results 
 A Spearman’s rank correlation matrix was first run to identify the relevant variables for 
each of the knowledge sources. Ideally, all variables would have been entered simultaneously or 
in blocks as part of a regression model, yet the small number of cases did not allow for this 
approach. Only predictors significantly correlated with a propensity to consider the different 
knowledge sources as more or less useful were included in a series of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression models. Instead of presenting correlation matrices, significant variables are 
flagged in the table below. The few missing values identified are replaced by using the multiple 
imputation procedure in SPSS. 
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Table 5: Usefulness of academic knowledge (N = 61
1
)
Variable B SE B β B SE B β
(Constant) 7.89 0.63 6.94 1.21
In touch at least once per month 0.86 0.36 0.28** 0.72 0.41 0.23*
Policy knowledge impossible to implement -0.41 0.16  -0.28** -0.38 0.17  -0.26**
Policy motivation: Science/evidence 0.19 0.11 0.20* 0.22 0.12 0.24*
Member of the NDP 0.23 0.42 0.07
Member of the LPC -0.17 0.58 -0.04
Level of education -0.13 0.27 -0.06
MP is a women 0.57 0.43 0.16
Age 0.02 0.02 0.14
Tenure in the House of Commons -0.03 0.07 -0.05
R
2
0.26 0.32
Adjusted R
2 0.23 0.20
F  change 6.88*** 0.73
*p < .10. **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
1
One outlier dropped due to likely questionnaire error
Model 1 Model 2
Table 4: Significant non-parametric correlations (N = 62)  
Academic research Think tanks Industry associations 
and businesses 
Not for profit 
organizations 
 
In touch at least once per 
month*** 
 
Policy knowledge 
impossible to implement** 
(-) 
 
Policy motivation: 
Science/evidence* 
 
 
In touch at least once per 
month** 
 
MP is a women*** 
 
 
Policy motivation:  
Constituency issues* (-) 
 
 
In touch at least once per 
month** 
 
Member of the NDP*** (-) 
 
Level of education** (-) 
 
Member of the 
opposition*** (-) 
 
MP is a women* (-) 
 
In touch at least once per 
month*** 
 
Length of tenure in the 
House of Commons** (-) 
 
Policy motivation:  
Requests from non-profits** 
 
*p < .10. **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01, - = negative correlation 
 
Regression models 
 Eight models were run to test the relative significance of the correlations reported in 
Table 4. For each knowledge source, the first model consists of variables significantly correlated 
with evaluations of usefulness that are not identified as controls. The second model adds the four 
control variables – even in cases where their correlations were not significant – as well as  
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Table 6: Usefulness of think tank knowledge (N = 60
2
)
Variable B SE B β B SE B β
(Constant) 7.50 1.14 7.75 1.51
In touch at least once per month 1.03 0.44 0.26** 1.03 0.53 0.26*
Policy motivation: Constituency -0.16 0.19 -0.10 -0.13 0.17 -0.08
Member of the NDP -1.15 0.50  -0.30**
Member of the LPC 0.19 0.63 0.03
Level of education -0.01 0.29 0.00
MP is a women 1.60 0.48 0.37***
Age 0.00 0.02 0.01
Tenure in the House of Commons -0.10 0.08 -0.16
R
2
0.12 0.34
Adjusted R
2 0.09 0.24
F  change 3.90** 2.84**
*p < .10. **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
2
Two outliers dropped due to likely questionnaire error
Model 1 Model 2
 
dummy variables for political party membership due to their importance within the Canadian 
parliamentary system. 
 
 
Table 7: Usefulness of private sector knowledge (N = 62)
Variable B SE B β B SE B β
(Constant) 5.06 0.48 9.51 1.54
In touch at least once per month 1.19 0.60 0.25** 1.18 0.53 0.25**
Member of the NDP -1.91 0.60  -0.42***
Member of the LPC -0.34 0.82 -0.05
Level of education -0.81 0.39  -0.27**
MP is a women -0.93 0.65 -0.18
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.11
Tenure in the House of Commons -0.12 0.10 -0.17
R
2
0.07 0.36
Adjusted R
2 0.05 0.28
F  change 4.19** 4.16***
*p < .10. **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
Model 2Model 1
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F. Discussion 
 The only universal tendency across all evaluations of policy information usefulness is the 
positive influence of regular contact between Members and the knowledge purveyor. Meeting at 
least once per month was significantly correlated with MPs rating a knowledge provider’s 
information as more useful. This held across all models, even with the inclusion of control 
variables. What is perhaps most surprising is that political party membership, while playing a 
role in how frequently MPs meet with various actors, does not nullify the effect regular meetings 
have on positive perceptions. Thus, while being a member of the NDP was associated with a 
more negative evaluation of knowledge supplied by industry for example, the association 
between regular meetings and a positive evaluation of usefulness was present even for the 
members of that party. Such observations provide support for Weible et al.’s (2012) suggestion 
that regularly contacting decision-makers and building relationships pay over the long run. 
However, the particular cause and effect relationship should be explored further through a panel 
Table 8: Usefulness of non-profit knowledge (N = 62)
Variable B SE B β B SE B β
(Constant) 5.59 0.52 6.18 1.08
In touch at least once per month 1.08 0.48 0.30** 0.95 0.49 0.26*
Policy motivation: Requests from non-profits 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.22
Member of the NDP -0.33 0.42 -0.12
Member of the LPC -0.45 0.58 -0.11
Level of education -0.19 0.28 -0.10
MP is a women 0.25 0.45 0.08
Age 0.01 0.02 0.09
Tenure in the House of Commons -0.12 0.07  -0.27*
R
2
0.16 0.25
Adjusted R
2 0.14 0.14
F  change 5.86*** 1.04
*p < .10. **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
Model 1 Model 2
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study. Such a design is required in order to evaluate whether legislators increasingly consider 
certain information sources as useful after regular interactions with policy actors, or if  they meet 
with certain organizations or individuals because they initially perceive the information supplier 
positively. 
Subjective policy motivations were significantly associated with the perceived usefulness 
of three of the four information sources in initial bivariate tests. This finding suggests that MPs’ 
values – expressed as motivations for policy-making – may also be significant factors for 
knowledge utilization. The relationships are somewhat predictable; valuing evidence and science 
was associated with a tendency to judge academic knowledge as more useful; similarly, a 
correlation was found between the degree to which demands from non-profit organizations serve 
as a motivation for policy and the usefulness of the information they provide. Somewhat more 
puzzling was a negative relationship observed between the usefulness of knowledge emanating 
from think tanks/policy institutes and the importance of constituency issues as a policy 
motivation. Perhaps think tanks are perceived to be particularly exclusive or elitist in Canada 
given their relatively weak position in the policy process (Abelson, 2000), or more plausibly, the 
types of issues addressed may be more national than local in scope. In the regression models, two 
of the three motivations did not prove to be significant predictors. For academic knowledge, 
however, science or evidence as a policy motivation, on the one hand, and disagreement with the 
belief that policy suggestions are impractical or impossible to implement on the other, were 
positively correlated with a tendency to consider academic research useful. This relationship 
remained significant even when introducing political party dummies and other controls. Such a 
finding raises questions as to the source of policy motivations and beliefs. Being a member of the 
Liberal party (ρ = 0.310, p < 0.05) and having a higher level of education (ρ = 0.380, p < 0.01) 
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were two variables associated with ranking science and evidence higher on the list of policy 
motivations. Yet, the regression model indicates that this does not fully capture the importance of 
the subjective motivation as an independent effect. Furthermore, a belief that most policy 
suggestions are impractical or impossible to implement was not associated with any of the 
theoretically plausible pathways. Along with the high value placed on objective knowledge by 
MPs more generally, these results raise interesting questions as to the influence of recent 
campaigns for more “evidence-based” policy-making in Canadian federal politics (Semeniuk, 
2013). 
As far as information supplied by think tanks and industry are concerned, more partisan 
demarcation lines were identified. For instance, being a member of the NDP was found to 
significantly affect the MP’s perception of knowledge usefulness – negatively, in both cases. 
Perceived usefulness of policy information supplied by the private sector was lower amongst 
New Democrats in comparison to the ruling Conservatives, a fairly predictable result given the 
NDP’s social-democratic leanings7. On the other hand, a more negative evaluation of the 
usefulness of policy information produced by think tanks or policy institutes within the NDP is 
puzzling. While the partisanship of think tanks is well-known (Tapp, 2014), there is little 
evidence of ideological imbalance in Canada’s policy institute landscape.  More likely however, 
is that the result is spurious, due to the important positive correlation between being a women 
and judging policy information provided by think tanks as more useful. This is supported by the 
fact that women are overrepresented in the NDP and that there is no significant bivariate 
relationship between being a member of this party and the usefulness of think tank knowledge. 
The finding that women, more than men, tend to view think tanks and policy institutes as more 
                                                          
7
 In the bivariate analysis, being a Member of the Opposition was also a significant predictor. This variable could 
not be included in the model due to multi-collinearity. 
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useful is also somewhat difficult to explain, yet the effect is significant in both multivariate and 
bivariate analysis, indicating a fairly robust association. More in-depth qualitative research could 
shed light on this interesting correlation. 
In the case of knowledge conveyed by the private sector, the survey reveals that 
education was a significant factor as results show a negative association between higher 
education levels and the identification of private sector knowledge as useful. This could be 
explained by a tendency for highly educated individuals to value objectivity in policy 
information and to perceive industry and business organizations as especially biased.  
Finally, evidenced by the lowest R
2
 for the full model, differences in MPs’ tendency to 
consider non-profit organizations as more or less useful were not well explained by the models. 
The problem may relate to the diversity of non-profit organizations in Canada, as the latter cover 
a wide range of interests and ideologies – from church groups to Greenpeace. Yet the finding 
that more experienced MPs tended to consider non-profits as less useful is interesting, and may 
reflect the reality that there is perhaps less to be gained politically from following the advice of 
advocacy groups: they do not create jobs nor usually represent clear electoral gains. 
G. Limitations 
 This study was initially intended to be mostly descriptive; the questionnaire was thus kept 
short due to considerations of time pressure MPs face in their work. Therefore, variables for 
multivariate analysis were perhaps not ideally constructed. Some of the scales, such as the 
frequency of meetings with various actors, had to be simplified in order to minimize recall bias, 
with a similar issue emerging for the variable measuring MPs’ tenure in the House of Commons. 
Second, with a simple, cross-sectional research design, causality cannot be inferred and findings 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9 No. 3 2015-2016: 99-130. 
124 
 
should only be interpreted as correlational. In addition, the analysis’ reliance on self-reports may 
have introduced more measurement error than if the data had been based on objective 
measurements. Finally, question marks remain as to whether positive evaluations of policy 
information usefulness result in further knowledge utilization (See Knott and Wildavsky, 1980). 
The tentative suggestion is that positive evaluations will certainly not be detrimental to the 
reception of policy recommendations, yet it is probably unlikely that backbench MPs will 
attempt or be able to implement policy proposals wholesale. 
 
Conclusion 
 A popular conception of backbenchers is that they are largely irrelevant actors in the 
Canadian policy process. The results obtained in this modest study indicate that MPs remain 
interested in policy-making: only 8.9% of MPs stated that they never had a policy idea not 
explicitly part of their Party’s platform, while 67.5% claimed to have held independent policy 
goals at the time of their election. Moreover, nearly all backbenchers believed that their efforts 
could influence policy at both the national and local level. This paper sought to better understand 
what information sources Canadian MPs consult in their policy-making efforts and how different 
knowledge producers are perceived. A few knowledge sources were reported to be almost 
universally consulted by MPs: the Library of Parliament, academic research, and constituents. 
Interestingly, MPs considered academic research as very useful, a fact owing to a high premium 
placed on objective and verifiable policy information. When it came to evaluating the usefulness 
of information provided by academics or representatives from think tanks, non-profit 
organizations and the private sector, regular personal contact was almost always associated with 
more positive evaluations of the information provided, even when controlling for political party 
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and a number of different demographic characteristics. This finding supports the notion that 
Parliamentarians respond positively to the lobbying by external policy actors. Thus, the addition 
of “network dynamics” to Lester and Wild’s (1990) model of knowledge utilization described at 
the outset of this study appear to be supported.  
 Beyond this, very few factors were relevant for more than one knowledge source. A path 
of further enquiry, and an approach largely absent from the literature, would be to focus on how 
explanatory factors affect the utilization of knowledge sources in different ways. For example, 
ascribing greater importance to science and evidence in policy-making was correlated with the 
belief that academic research is useful, but this factor was not relevant for information supplied 
by think tanks, as well as the private and non-profit sectors. Whether regular lobbying can play a 
role in changing decision-makers’ reception of policy information appears to be supported by the 
study, yet many questions remain for future research. The length, type, and limits of lobbying, as 
well the various reasons why MPs may act on behalf of external actors are all issues which 
should be further investigated in Canada. 
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